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Communication, perception and behaviour
during a natural disaster involving a ‘Do Not
Drink’ and a subsequent ‘Boil Water’ notice: a
postal questionnaire study
Gabriella Rundblad1*, Olivia Knapton1, Paul R Hunter2
Abstract
Background: During times of public health emergencies, effective communication between the emergency
response agencies and the affected public is important to ensure that people protect themselves from injury or
disease. In order to investigate compliance with public health advice during natural disasters, we examined
consumer behaviour during two water notices that were issued as a result of serious flooding. During the summer
of 2007, 140,000 homes in Gloucestershire, United Kingdom, that are supplied water from Mythe treatment works,
lost their drinking water for up to 17 days. Consumers were issued a ‘Do Not Drink’ notice when the water was
restored, which was subsequently replaced with a ‘Boil Water’ notice. The rare occurrence of two water notices
provided a unique opportunity to compare compliance with public health advice. Information source use and
other factors that may affect consumer perception and behaviour were also explored.
Method: A postal questionnaire was sent to 1,000 randomly selected households. Chi-square, ANOVA, MANOVA
and generalised estimating equation (with and without prior factor analysis) were used for quantitative analysis.
Results: In terms of information sources, we found high use of and clear preference for the local radio throughout
the incident, but family/friends/neighbours also proved crucial at the onset. Local newspapers and the water
company were associated with clarity of advice and feeling informed, respectively. Older consumers and those in
paid employment were particularly unlikely to read the official information leaflets. We also found a high degree of
confusion regarding which notice was in place at which time, with correct recall varying between 23.2%-26.7%,
and a great number of consumers believed two notices were in place simultaneously. In terms of behaviour,
overall non-compliance levels were significantly higher for the ‘Do Not Drink’ notice (62.9%) compared to the ‘Boil
Water’ notice (48.3%); consumers in paid employment were not likely to comply with advice. Non-compliance with
the general advice to boil bowser water was noticeably lower (27.3%).
Conclusion: Higher non-compliance during the ‘Do Not Drink’ notice was traced to the public’s limited knowledge
of water notices and their folk beliefs about the protection offered from boiling water. We suggest that future
information dissemination plans reduce reliance on official leaflets and maximise the potential of local media and
personal networks. Current public health education programmes are recommended to attend to insufficient and
incorrect public knowledge about precautionary actions.
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Background
During times of major public health emergencies, good
communication between the emergency response agen-
cies and the public in affected areas is vital [1]. Effective
communication is particularly important when it is
essential that people take steps to protect themselves
from injury or disease. When looking at why people did
not evacuate the city prior to the arrival of Hurricane
Katrina, Brodie and colleagues [2] found that about one-
third did not get the message and a further one-third
heard the message but did not understand how to evac-
uate. They also reported that people who did not evacu-
ate were predominantly from the poorest and most
marginalised sections of society. Further, following ter-
rorist attacks, good communication with the public is
essential not only to reduce acute morbidity and mortal-
ity but also in mediating the social and psychological
impact of terrorist attacks [3]. Indeed, it has been
argued that poor communication may itself pose a risk
to health by heightening anxiety and the development of
somatoform disorders [4].
The experience of Hurricane Katrina reported by
Brodie and colleagues [2] illustrates the main issues
associated with risk communication during natural dis-
asters. Firstly, getting the message to all the people
including the poor and marginalised sections of
society, and secondly, ensuring that the message is
understood and leads to appropriate responses. Typi-
cally, risk communication is considered to contain four
components: message, source, transmitter and receiver
[e.g. [5]]. Original theories of risk communication drew
upon the concept of the individual as a ‘rational actor’
who receives information from a knowledgeable
authority source and then uses this information to
manage and minimize their risk exposure [6]. Argu-
ably, non-compliance is not necessarily driven by a
lack of knowledge or an ‘information gap’ between offi-
cial sources and the public. Rather it is a combination
of individual and other societal factors that leads an
individual to make active choices concerning their
behaviour. These factors range from demographics,
knowledge and previous experience of similar situa-
tions, and general health beliefs and attitudes towards
risks and preventative actions, to the particular trans-
mitter(s) used to convey the message to the public.
Previous transmitter studies have highlighted the
impact of media [7-9] and interpersonal contacts with
health professionals [10]. Compliance studies have,
however, found that whether consumers received the
advice from a leaflet or some type of mass media did
not impact compliance [11,12]. In September 2005, a
category 3 hurricane, Hurricane Rita, made landfall on
the Texas/Louisiana border, US. The chaos brought
about by Hurricane Rita was such that word of mouth
proved more useful than media channels [13].
On the 19th-20th July 2007, the equivalent of two
months of rain (125 mm) fell over Gloucestershire (total
population 528,370) and neighbouring areas in the Uni-
ted Kingdom (UK), causing Britain’s ‘largest peacetime
emergency since World War II’ [[14]:vii]. There was
widespread flash flooding and fluvial flooding of the
River Severn and the River Avon. Approximately two
days later, Mythe water treatment works (which is one
of the main water works in Gloucestershire and is man-
aged by Severn Trent Water (STW)) was flooded and
Castle Mead electricity substation had to be shut down,
leaving 140,000 homes (ca. 340,000-350,000 consumers)
without mains water [15] and 48,000 homes without
electricity [16]. While electricity was returned within 48
hours, consumers were left without drinking water for
up to 17 days. No UK water company has ever experi-
enced loss of supply on such a large scale before [15].
Before mains water was restored to normal, alternative
supplies were provided. A total of 40 million bottles of
water were distributed and an average of 3 million litres
of water per day provided by mobile water tanks (bow-
sers). The provision of bowser and bottled water gener-
ally overlapped. Water restoration began on 27th July,
after confirmed delivery to all affected consumers of a
non-standard ‘Do Not Drink’ notice devised by the
regional health authority (Gloucestershire Primary Care
Trust). The ‘Do Not Drink’ notice was replaced by a
water industry standard precautionary ‘Boil Water’
notice seven days later, at which point the bowsers were
withdrawn. On 7th August, the water company (STW)
declared the tap water safe to drink. The day before, the
emergency phase of the Gloucestershire floods had been
formally declared over and recovery begun [17].
When there is a risk that public health is threatened
through contaminated drinking water, one of three stan-
dard notices may be issued: ‘Boil Water’ (= water safe to
ingest after it has been boiled), ‘Do Not Drink’ (= water
should not be ingested) and ‘Do Not Use’ (= water should
not be used). While ‘Boil Water’ notices are relatively
common, ‘Do Not Drink’ notices are rarely issued, and the
combination of two notices is exceptionally rare [18,19].
‘Do Not Drink’ notices are generally reserved to incidents
where short-term exposure to contaminants is likely to
have adverse health effects [20]; for the Mythe incident,
the risk turned out to be minimal [15]. The issuing of a
‘Do Not Drink’ and a subsequent ‘Boil Water’ notice dur-
ing the same natural disaster afforded us a unique oppor-
tunity to investigate compliance with public health advice
and to investigate factors associated with risky and cau-
tious behaviour to this advice (including the general advice
always to boil bowser water before consumption).
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Method
Study design and sample selection
A postal questionnaire study of 1,000 households sup-
plied with mains water from Mythe waterworks and
affected by loss of water and two subsequent water
notices during summer 2007 was carried out in January-
February 2009 (18 months after the incident). Assuming
a response rate of 40%, 1000 questionnaires would yield
a sample size of 400 which would give a standard error
of less than 2.5%. Postcodes of affected households were
provided by the Drinking Water Inspectorate. Full
addresses were obtained using the Royal Mail Postcode
Address File and 1,000 addresses were selected using a
random number generator. Addresses were scrutinised
and any businesses and schools were replaced with a
further randomised selection of residential addresses.
Ethical approval was received from the King’s College
London Social Sciences, Humanities and Law Research
Ethics Sub Committee.
Questionnaire design
A questionnaire containing nine sections was con-
structed. A short section on demographics was followed
by four sections that followed the chronological order of
the incident: the initial period without mains water
(’Water Loss’), the ‘Do Not Drink’ notice, the ‘Boil
Water’ notice, and the time immediately after the water
had been declared safe to drink (’Water Safe’). The sec-
tions for the four ‘incident stages’ contained questions
about the respondents’ uses of water straight from the
tap (if any), uses of boiled water (if any), types of cold
water used for drinking, the advice that they remem-
bered receiving and the information sources from which
they got their advice. Following these ‘incident stages’
sections, the questionnaire ended with several shorter
sections concerning the use of temporary water supplies
(in particular bowser water), use of information sources,
information source preferences and previous experience
and knowledge of water incidents. Mainly closed ques-
tions were employed. Open-ended questions were pre-
dominantly used towards the end of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was piloted twice on undergraduate
students from King’s College London (N = 50), and
minor revisions were made in order to improve clarity.
The final questionnaire was sent out together with a
detailed project description and a stamped, addressed
return envelope. Non-responders were sent a reminder
four weeks later.
Coding
Where respondents ticked rather than ranked options
on the four ranking questions, one tick alone was coded
as rank one. If a respondent ranked several options and
then ticked one further option, the ticked option was
coded as their lowest rank. If only ticks were used, these
were given the same rank (e.g., three ticks were ranked
as 2). Between 46 and 63 of the participants used ticks.
For ‘tick only one’ questions, multiple ticks were typi-
cally entered as inconclusive. However, for questions
such as those asking what water notice participants
remembered being in place during one of the incident
stages, we coded multiple ticks as ‘believed more than
one advice was in place’ in order to allow analysis of
uncertainty. For questions where respondents selected
‘other’ and then qualitatively specified their answer,
these were re-coded into the original categories where
possible. Similarly for information sources, website
usage was re-coded so that only sources that occur
solely on the internet are in the category ‘websites’,
while e.g., ‘local radio’ included listening, phoning and
visiting the website of this source. Replies from between
two and ten participants under the categories ‘other’
and/or ‘websites’ were re-coded into original categories.
Open-ended questions were also quantified where possi-
ble; for example, occupations were translated into the
binary categories ‘yes, currently employed’ and ‘no, not
currently employed’. Across all questions, non-responses
were coded as missing data and inconclusive replies
were generally excluded from further analysis.
Analyses and hypotheses
The data were entered into Microsoft Access 2007 and
then validated against the original questionnaires. For
statistical comparison, data were transferred into SPSS
version 16 and validated a second time, with the excep-
tion of demographic comparison which was performed
using StatsDirect. Some questions were not (fully)
answered by all respondents, thus sample size often var-
ied between questions.
We hypothesised apriori that non-compliance with
water advice would be higher for the ‘Do Not Drink’
phase compared to the ‘Boil Water’ one. In addition, we
predicted that demographic factors (such as age, gender,
home ownership and employment), prior beliefs/experi-
ences, use of information sources, and practical issues
(e.g. loss of electricity) could have had an effect on par-
ticipants’ perceptions and behaviours; however, as no
formal hypotheses were defined apriori, statistical out-
comes should be interpreted solely as indicators of the
potential strength of association. Quantitative analysis is
mainly descriptive. Inferential analysis was carried out
using chi-square, ANOVA, and for repeated measures
generalised estimating equations (with and without prior
factor analysis). For analyses with multiple outcome
variables, initial analysis was done using multivariate
ANOVA with all possible outcome and predictor vari-
ables. For all analyses with multiple predictor variables,
only those variables that were significant at the p < 0.2
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level in single predictor models were included in the
multiple predictor models. The least significant variable
was then removed from the model until all predictor
variables were significant at the p < 0.2 level. The value
of the model in predicting each dependent variable was
then derived from the tests of between subjects effects
in the corrected model. Throughout, the level of signifi-
cance was set at 5% and only responses with at least 10
responses deferred from the median response were
included as dependent variables.
Results
Response rate and demographics
A total of 195 completed questionnaires were returned,
giving a response rate of almost 20%. Thirty-six respon-
dents stated that they did not lose their tap water during
the incident. These were excluded from analysis, yield-
ing a total sample size of 159 affected consumers.
To check for sampling bias, we compared the demo-
graphic characteristics of our respondents with those for
Gloucestershire residents using the 2001 census survey
(Table 1)[21]. Overall, our sample is representative.
There is, however, an under-representation of younger
and male participants, which is a common pattern in
postal questionnaire studies [22]. There is also a dispro-
portionate number of home owners and professionals
versus people with elementary skills (e.g. farmers, por-
ters, cleaners), which ties in with response rates typically
being higher in the higher social classes than in the
lower classes [23].
Participant experiences during the 2007 floods and
participant backgrounds
During the 2007 floods, 33 respondents (20.9%) lost
their main electricity and two (1.3%) were flooded.
Twenty-seven participants (17.1%) chose to leave their
homes due to the disaster. Of these, 23 stated that the
main reason for not staying was difficulties managing
without mains water, with several highlighting that they
had (young) children or were ‘vulnerable’ due to ill
Table 1 Demographic comparison of study respondents with the 2001 census for Gloucestershire
n Study population % (LCI - UCI) Census population %
Gender
male 62 40.0 (32.2 - 48.2) 48.8*
female 93 60.0 (51.8 - 67.8) 51.2*
Age
29/30 or youngera 10 6.3 (3.1 - 11.3) 16.7*
30/31 to 59/60b 83 52.5 (44.4 - 60.5) 42.4*
60/61 or olderc 65 41.1 (33.4 - 49.2) 22.4*
Ethnicity
white UK 150 96.8 (92.6 - 98.9) 95.6
white non-UK 3 1.9 (0.4 - 5.6) 1.6
non-white 2 1.3 (0.2 - 4.6) 2.8
Home ownership
sole/joint owner 138 87.3 (81.1 - 92.1) 74.3*
renting from council 13 8.2 (4.5 - 13.7) 8.5
renting privately 7 4.4 (1.8 - 8.9) 8.3
Occupationd
managers & senior officials 14 15.1 (8.5 - 24.0) 15.3
professional 24 25.8 (17.3 - 35.9) 10.9*
associate prof. & technical 12 12.9 (6.8 - 21.5) 13.8
admin & secretarial 21 22.6 (14.6 - 32.4) 13.6*
skilled trade 8 8.6 (3.8 - 16.2) 12.4
personal service 4 4.3 (1.2 - 10.6) 6.5
sales & customer service 4 4.3 (1.2 - 10.6) 7.1
process & machine operatives 4 4.3 (1.2 - 10.6) 8.9
elementary 2 2.2 (0.3 - 7.6) 11.5*
a Comprises our categories 20 or younger and 21-30 with the census categories 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29.
b Comprises our categories 31-40, 41-50 and 51-60 with the census categories 30-34, 35-39, 40-44,45-49, 50-54 and 55-59.
c Comprises our categories 61-70 and 71 or older with the census categories 60-64, 65-69, 70-74,75-79, 80-84 and 85+.
d Occupation data collected through an open-ended question was re-coded on a nine point Socio-Economic Scale adhering to the British Standard Occupational
Classification 2000 [40] and using the Computer Assisted Structured Coding Tool [41].
*Census population estimate falls outside 95% confidence interval of census population.
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health. Only one person left because of the floods, while
no one stated loss of electricity or their home being
flooded as their main reason.
Five households (3.2%) reported experience of flooding
prior to the floods of 2007, but none of them were
flooded during the Mythe incident. Forty-nine partici-
pants (31.6%) had previously experienced tap water loss;
thirty-three of them recalled the cause being mainte-
nance work and/or burst mains pipes, whereas only four
had experienced water loss due to natural events such
as floods or snow/ice. For the majority of these previous
experiences (79.6%), participants could not recall if a
water notice had been issued or they did not specify.
Eight participants were certain that they did not receive
a notice, whereas one participant recalled a ‘Do Not
Drink’ notice and another a ‘Do Not Use’ notice.
In their general everyday life (i.e. outside the context
of the incident), our participants show a very strong pre-
ference for tap water (124/151 (straight from the tap 92/
151, boiled or filtered 32/151)), with only 16.5% prefer-
ring some type of bottled water and 1.3% stating that
they drink other drinks than water.
Information sources
Generally, information about the (imminent) loss of tap
water reached consumers via the local radio station (i.e.,
BBC Radio Gloucestershire) or they were told by family/
friends (30.7% and 30.0%, respectively (N = 140)). As
Table 2 shows, those who did not find out about the
planned shutdown of the tap water beforehand usually
became aware when they turned on their taps and no
water came out (13.6%). When the water came back on,
three consecutive notices were issued by the authorities:
‘Do Not Drink’, ‘Boil Water’ and ‘Water Safe’. Although
the authorities had official water notice leaflets delivered
to all households, only an average of 40% used them as
an information source. Instead, information about the
notices tended to reach consumers through other chan-
nels; notably, local radio remained the primary informa-
tion source throughout these three stages: 61.1%, 55.7%,
and 56.9%, respectively. Similarly, when participants
were asked to rank the information sources in order of
preference for the incident, local radio was ranked high-
est (53.4%, N = 118), followed by family/friends (11.9%),
local newspapers (11.0%) and STW (by telephone or
internet) (10.2%).
While information source use did not differ much
between the three notice stages, the total number of
sources used did differ. The total number of information
sources utilised during the ‘Do Not Drink’ stage was
higher (M = 2.602, LCI = 2.320, UCI = 2.884) compared
to the ‘Boil Water’ (M = 2.019, LCI = 1.792, UCI =
2.247) and ‘Water Safe’ (M = 2.146, LCI = 1.919, UCI =
2.372) stages, as confirmed by a repeated measures
ANOVA with Bonferroni adjustment (F(1) = 10.747, p =
.001).
In order to investigate whether our predictor factors
were associated with consumers’ choice of information
source, we entered the information sources as well as
the total number of information sources used during the
incident into a MANOVA as dependent variables, with
gender, age, home ownership and whether or not in
Table 2 Use of information sources for all four stages of the incident
Information source ’Water Loss’a
(N = 140)
’Do Not Drink’
(N = 144)
’Boil Water’
(N = 115)
’Water Safe’
(N = 137)
n % n % n % n %
I turned on the tap and no water came outb 19 13.6
family/friend/neighbour 42 30.0 22 15.3 12 10.4 28 20.4
leaflet through the postc 8 5.7 66 45.8 44 38.3 51 37.2
local newspaper 4 2.9 53 36.8 32 27.8 40 29.2
national newspaper 0 0 6 4.2 0 0 2 1.5
local charity/volunteers 1 0.7 4 2.8 1 0.9 2 1.5
GP/nurse/health organisation 0 0 0 0 2 1.8 1 0.7
water company 0 0 60 41.7 41 35.7 48 35.0
TV 15 10.7 40 27.8 19 16.5 32 23.4
local radio 43 30.7 88 61.1 64 55.7 78 56.9
national radio 3 2.1 5 3.5 2 1.7 5 3.6
local government/council 0 0 3 2.1 3 2.6 1 0.7
website 1 0.7 15 10.4 8 6.9 7 5.1
other 4 2.9 3 2.1 4 2.5 3 2.2
a For the ‘Water Loss’ stage, respondents could only choose one option (i.e. the information source first used), whereas for all other stages multiple responses
were possible.
b Option only available for the ‘Water Loss’ stage.
c No leaflets were handed out during the ‘Water Loss’ stage.
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paid employment as the independent variables. The final
parameter estimates in the final analysis are shown in
Table 3. The key observations are that increasing age and
being in paid employment were negatively associated
with using leaflets and using the local newspaper was
marginally associated with increasing age. This would
suggest that older consumers, in particular, but also
those in paid employment do not seem to have used the
leaflets. For example in the ‘Do Not Drink’ phase 43 of
83 (52%) respondents under 60 years reported using the
leaflet compared to only 23 of 60 (38%) of people over
60. In the ‘Boil Water’ phase, these responses were 30/71
(42%) and 14/44 (32%) respectively.
Advice recollection
Most consumers (75.6% (118/156)) were informed about
the loss of tap water beforehand. The majority of consu-
mers reported receiving tap water advice (’Do Not
Drink’: 138/155; ‘Boil Water’: 110/154; ‘Water Safe’:136/
154), with 94 consumers (63.9%) reporting receiving all
three notices. Several consumers reported not receiving
advice about their tap water during one or more of the
stages; notably, five consumers reported receiving no
advice at all.
As Table 4 shows, there was a lot of confusion as to
which water notices were in place during the ‘Do Not
Drink’ and ‘Boil Water’ stages, with correct recall
varying from 23.2% (33/142) to 26.7% (31/116). During
the ‘Do Not Drink’ stage, most consumers believed two
notices were in place at the same time; alternatively the
‘Do Not Drink’ notice was confused with ‘Do Not Use’
and ‘Boil Water’. Similarly, half of consumers - males in
particular - recalled that when the first notice was chan-
ged, the new advice was that the water was safe.
We queried how clear the advice about tap water was
using a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘very unclear’,
2 =’unclear’, 3 =’understandable’, 4 =’clear’, and 5 =’very
clear’). Twenty-three consumers (16.3%) stated that the
advice was ‘very clear’, 59 (41.8%) that it was ‘clear’ and
a further 41 (29.1%) felt that it was ‘understandable’
(N = 141). Similarly, a four-point Likert scale (1 =’very
uninformed’ - 4 =’very informed’) revealed that the
majority of consumers felt ‘informed’ (97/142) or ‘very
informed’ (22/142). Not surprisingly, consumers who
left their homes during the crisis consistently gave lower
ratings for clarity of advice and feeling informed.
We used a MANOVA to test the association between
information source use (i.e. family/friends/neighbour,
leaflet through the post, local newspaper, water com-
pany, TV, local radio, and the number of information
sources used) and clarity of advice and feeling informed.
The final model is shown in Table 5. Use of local news-
papers as an information source was positively asso-
ciated with increased clarity of advice. Water company
use was associated with feeling informed. The associa-
tion between use of the local radio and feeling informed
was approaching significance.
Water access and preferences
For the incident as a whole, 21 of the 69 participants
who used temporary water supplies reported serious
problems securing access to temporary water supplies.
Access failures were mainly due to empty bowsers and/
or no available stock of bottled water (n = 15). Other
reasons included problems travelling to and from the
water sites (n = 6) or not being able to locate them (n =
7). Except for one participant who had to rely solely on
water supplied by family/friends, consumers did on at
least one occasion gain access to temporary water sup-
plied by STW.
Table 3 Final parameter estimates of MANOVA of
predictors of information source use
Dependent variable Predictor
variables
B LCI UCI p
family/friend/
neighbour
Intercept 0.139 -0.057 0.335
Age 0.024 -0.02 0.069 0.287
paid employment -0.094 -0.228 0.039 0.165
leaflet through the
post
Intercept 0.884 0.638 1.129
Age -0.113 -0.169 -0.057 0.0001
paid employment -0.239 -0.407 -0.071 0.006
local newspaper Intercept 0.079 -0.166 0.324
Age 0.06 0.004 0.116 0.034
paid employment 0.09 -0.078 0.257 0.292
Table 4 Advice recollection for the ‘Do Not Drink’ and ‘Boil Water’ stages.
’Do Not Drink’ (N = 142) ’Boil Water’ (N = 116)
n % n %
there was one advice: do not use 23 16.2 1 0.9
there was one advice: do not drink 33 23.2 9 7.8
there was one advice: boil 24 16.9 31 26.7
there was one advice: safe 2 1.4 58 50.0
not sure what the advice was 10 7.0 9 7.8
there was more than one type of advice 50 35.2 8 6.9
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During the ‘Water Loss’ stage, collecting bottled water
from distribution sites was the most favoured means of
procuring water (84.9%, N = 159), compared to bowser
water (57.9%). In addition, 35.8% of consumers bought
bottled water, or collected water from family/friends
(8.2%). Consumers who found out about the water loss
beforehand tended to refrain from buying bottled water,
instead opting for supplied bottled water. Consumers
who generally (i.e. outside the context of the incident)
prefer to drink water straight from the tap also tended
to refrain from buying bottled water, with many of them
choosing to get water from family/friends in unaffected
areas.
For the ‘Do Not Drink’ and ‘Boil Water’ stages, consu-
mers were asked to rank different types of drinking
water in terms of frequency of use. Based on these data,
we can discern popularity in terms of how many
respondents used a particular source as well as its mode
rank and the total number of rank 1s that it received
(Table 6). Both in terms of users and ranks, tap water
was the least preferred water source for both stages,
including tap water from family/friends, while bottled
water was clearly the favoured type of drinking water.
Although many households did collect water from bow-
sers for drinking purposes, rank data shows it to be
quite unpopular.
We also found that 28 participants (17.6%) carried on
using temporary water sources after the tap water was
safe, because they were not convinced that it was safe,
and some also commented that the water was dirty,
cloudy and smelly, or tasted strange.
Tap water behaviour and compliance
Participants were asked to specify their use of tap water
during the ‘Do Not Drink’ and ‘Boil Water’ stages
(Table 7). Of particular concern is the high proportion
of consumers who ingested (i.e. brushed teeth, prepared
food/cook and drunk) unboiled tap water; a risky beha-
viour which increased substantially when the advice
changed to ‘Boil Water’. Ingestion of boiled water dur-
ing the ‘Do Not Drink’ stage was also risky and promi-
nent. Table 7 also reveals that some consumers
refrained from using tap water for safe actions such as
hand washing, showering/bathing and toilet flushing, or
they used boiled tap water for these purposes. Thus,
individuals’ tap water actions commonly included both
risky and over-cautious behaviour.
Regarding compliance with water advice about drink-
ing, 47.2% (75/159; based on respondents drinking water
straight from the tap and/or boiled tap water during the
‘Do Not Drink’ stage) versus 29.3% (34/116; based on
respondents drinking unboiled tap water during the
‘Boil Water’ stage) of respondents did not comply with
the notices. Looking at overall compliance with water
advice, i.e., including brushing teeth and preparing/
cooking food, non-compliance increases to 62.9% (100/
159) and 48.3% (56/116) for the ‘Do Not Drink’ and the
‘Boil Water’ notices, respectively. The higher non-com-
pliance rates for ‘Do Not Drink’ are pre-dominantly
attributed to the high use of boiled tap water.
In order to test our hypothesis that non-compliance
would be greater for ‘Do Not Drink’, we used a general-
ised estimating equation with drinking water compliance
and overall compliance as dependent variables and with
incident stage, demographics and participants’ general
drinking water preference and previous experience of
loss of tap water as predictor variables. The final model
is shown in Table 8. It can be seen that the main factor
associated with both drinking water compliance and
Table 5 Final parameter estimates of MANOVA of
predictors of clarity of advice and feeling informed
Dependent variable Predictor variables B LCI UCI p
clarity of advice Intercept 3.204 2.894 3.513
local newspaper 0.559 0.134 0.983 0.010
water company 0.278 -0.111 0.668 0.160
local radio 0.232 -0.142 0.606 0.222
feeling informed Intercept 2.627 2.406 2.848
local newspaper 0.193 -0.11 0.496 0.210
water company 0.314 0.036 0.592 0.027
local radio 0.255 -0.012 0.522 0.061
Table 6 Water drinking preference for the ‘Do Not Drink’ and ‘Boil Water’ stages.
’Do Not Drink’ (N = 155) ’Boil Water’ (N = 108)
Popularity of water sources No of Users Mode rank Rank 1s (%) No of Users Mode rank Rank 1s (%)
bottled water from distribution site 133 1 70.0 90 1 69.9
bought bottled water, still 73 1 20.0 46 2 16.3
water from bowsers 34 2 3.8 18 2 3.3
bought bottled water, sparkling 21 2 2.3 9 2 1.1
chilled boiled tap water 17 2 0.0 8 2 2.2
water straight from the tap 13 8 0.8 21 2 3.3
tap water from family/friends 12 1 3.1 4 1 2.2
filtered tap water 8 7 0.0 9 1 2.2
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overall compliance is incident stage (i.e. ‘Do Not Drink’
stage versus ‘Boil Water’ stage), confirming our hypoth-
esis. Drinking water compliance was, in addition, asso-
ciated with employment, i.e. those in paid employment
were less likely to comply. There was some suggestion
that females were more likely to be compliant, but this
association was not significant.
Furthermore, respondents’ reported use of unboiled
and boiled tap water during the ‘Do Not Drink’ and
‘Boil Water’ stages was analysed by rotated Equamax
factor analysis followed by generalised estimating equa-
tion analysis with demographics, sources of information
used and participants’ general drinking water preference
and previous experience of loss of tap water as predictor
variables. No significant associations were identified.
Bowser water behaviour and compliance
Ingestion of unboiled bowser water was limited (Table 9).
In contrast to tap water compliance, only six of the
53 participants (11.3%) who utilised bowser water for
drinking during one or more stages of the incident failed
to comply with the advice to boil it before drinking it,
while overall non-compliance was 27.3% (21/77). Num-
bers were insufficient to determine factors associated
with compliance with advice on bowser water.
Discussion
The world faces unprecedented changes in climate and
environment, and an increased risk of natural disasters,
which for the UK will include floods, droughts and heat
waves [24]. Natural disasters, whether hurricanes or
floods, potentially pose a risk to drinking water and con-
sequently public health. After Hurricane Ami hit an
island of Fiji, nearly 75% of water samples taken showed
contamination [25]. Due to scarcity of safe water during
large emergencies, high incidences of fever, diarrhoeal
illnesses and skin infections are common place, at least
in low income countries [26]. Isolation from medical
care further increases rates of morbidity and mortality.
Where drinking water is still available, albeit not safe to
Table 7 Use of tap water during the ‘Do Not Drink’ and ‘Boil Water’ stages.
’Do Not Drink’ (N = 159) ’Boil Water’ (N = 116) p
n % n %
Using unboiled tap water for
flush toilet 148 93.1 105 90.5 0.439
shower/bathe 120 75.5 97 83.6 0.102
wash hands 83 52.2 81 69.8 0.003
prepare/cook food witha 34 21.4 49 42.2 2.0 × 10-4
brush teetha 26 16.4 44 37.8 4.9 × 10-5
Drinka 15 9.4 34 29.3 2.1 × 10-5
Using boiled tap water for
flush toilet 4 2.5 5 4.3 0.409
shower/bathe 6 3.8 5 4.3 0.823
wash hands 17 10.7 6 5.2 0.103
prepare/cook food withb 75 47.2 41 35.3 0.050
brush teethb 61 38.4 29 25.0 0.020
drink hotb 67 42.1 45 38.8 0.577
drink coldb 34 21.4 23 19.8 0.753
aAction not safe with unboiled water if a ‘Do Not Drink’ or Boil Water’ notice is in place.
bAction not safe with boiled water if a ‘Do Not Drink’ notice is in place.
Table 8 Final parameter estimates of generalised estimating equation of predictors of compliance with water advice
Dependent variables Predictor variables B LCI UCI p
drinking water compliance incident stage Do Not Drink 1
Boil Water 1.35 1.11 1.64 0.002
paid employment No 1
Yes 0.81 0.68 0.97 0.024
gender Male 1
Female 1.154 0.96 1.40 0.137
overall compliance incident stage Do Not Drink 1
Boil Water 1.79 1.34 2.34 2.3 × 10-5
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drink (with or without treatment), water advice is
issued. Public health communication is key to safe water
behaviour and compliance with advice.
Compliance studies have varied in methodology with
some focusing on unboiled tap water and others on
boiled water, reducing comparability across studies and
across notices. With the exception of the Hurricane Rita
study [13], previous studies have focused on human
error and everyday incidents, and for the absolute
majority of these, the notice investigated is ‘Boil Water’.
This study is the first to contrast advice recollection,
information use, water behaviour and compliance during
an incident involving two notices. It is also the first to
investigate a ‘Do Not Drink’ notice issued due to a nat-
ural disaster, and the first to include compliance with
the general advice to boil bowser water.
It should be noted that the study took place 18 months
after the incident. This may have resulted in a lower than
normal response rate. Compliance surveys sent out
within one month of the incident have yielded response
rates around 65% [e.g. [12]]. However, risk perception
studies normally attract response rates just below 20%
[e.g. [27]]. The time delay may also have impacted consu-
mers’ recall of actions and events. However, the 2007
Gloucestershire flood incident was unique and highly
memorable; our study has shown that consumers’ main
concern revolved around their tap water; and in focus
groups carried out after the postal questionnaire, consu-
mers shared very detailed accounts of the incident and
their quest to access safe drinking water. The time lag,
nevertheless, does place some restrictions on the results
and conclusions presented here.
Consumers relied on a range of sources for informa-
tion about safe water behaviour, and use of sources dif-
fered somewhat between the first and the subsequent
three stages, with the exception of local radio which
remained the primary source through the whole inci-
dent. Information usage was at its highest during the
‘Do Not Drink’ notice stage. In situations of lots of
uncertainty, the public commonly seeks out more infor-
mation sources [27].
During natural disasters, water advice has commonly
not reached consumers. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Rita, as few as 31% of people issued with a ‘Boil Water’
notice were aware of it [13]. In the present study, 3% of
participants reported not receiving any water advice at
all when the tap water was returned. In addition, several
consumers reported not receiving one of the advices.
Due to the nature of the crisis, Severn Trent Water was
not able to inform consumers before the water supply
failed. Similarly, printed media and media websites were
unable to deliver advance warnings. Official water
notices were, however, issued during the three subse-
quent stages. These were consulted by only about 40%
of consumers. Notably, older participants and those in
paid employment hardly used them. For an information
source that did reach all households, a 40% efficacy is
very worrying, and it is essential that we evaluate how
official advice is provided to the general public; espe-
cially since we also found that receiving information
from the water company was positively associated with
feeling informed. The apparent discrepancy most likely
stems, in part, from the fact that the first water notice
was not a standard water industry notice; thus, it is
therefore essential that standard water industry protocol
be upheld in future incidents. This is also the recom-
mendation of the Drinking Water Inspectorate in their
Incident Assessment Letter [20]. Another reason may be
the close collaboration between Severn Trent Water and
local media, which we discuss further below.
As printed information could not be made available
when the tap water was turned off, family/friends and
direct media such as radio and television featured pro-
minently during the first incident stage. In New South
Wales, 67% of people found out about severe storm
warnings through television, but during the storm they
relied more on radio and family/friends [28].
Personal dissemination networks have been shown to be
particularly vital for vulnerable sub-populations [29], and
interpersonal information is often perceived as more cred-
ible and efficient than official information sources [10,30].
Decisions on how to respond to flood warnings have also
been found to rely to some extent on the behaviours and
attitudes of people close by [31]. In the present study, we
found that family/friends/neighbours were the second
most preferred source along with local newspapers (which
was significantly used by older consumers) and the water
company, despite a drop in use after the initial stage which
presumably is due to the availability of printed media from
then onwards. Dissemination plans should be revised in
order to tap into family/friends/neighbours as a potential
information stream, e.g. personal networks and nomination
of local ‘disaster contact persons’ can be established
through local community organisations, and dissemination
through these networks should be given prominence.
Table 9 Use of unboiled bowser water during the first
three stages.
Use of unboiled bowser water n/Na %
prepare/cook food withb 16/72 22.2
brush teethb 11/47 23.4
drink coldb 5/50 10.0
drink hotb 5/31 16.1
a The number of participants who said they used unboiled bowser water (n)
out of the number of participants who used boiled and/or unboiled bowser
water (N). In total, 77 participants used bowser water for some purpose, but
not all of them replied to each bowser water question.
b Action not safe.
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Reflecting the complexity of the event and the combi-
nation of two subsequent notices, consumers’ advice
recollection was noticeably affected, leaving consumers
highly uncertain about which notice was in place when,
with significant proportions believing two notices were
in place at the same time. Clearly, the public is not
aware of the exclusive nature of notices (i.e. only one
can be in place at a time) or that there are several dif-
ferent types of notices. This could indicate that they
construe water as either safe or not safe.
Typically, non-compliance with ‘Boil Water’ advice
ranges between 9% and 20% [11,32] whereas after Hurri-
cane Rita, only one-third reported boiling water for
drinking [13]. If unsafe actions such as using unboiled
water for brushing teeth or preparing/cooking food are
considered, non-compliance increases dramatically to
57% and 77% for human error and natural disasters,
respectively [13,32]. Our data show high non-compli-
ance for the ‘Boil Water’ notice (29.3%), and when
including other unsafe behaviours, it rises to 48.3%.
Comparison of ‘Boil Water’ compliance for this incident
with preliminary results from a recent UK human error
‘Boil Water’ incident tentatively confirms that natural
disasters are associated with higher degrees of non-com-
pliance compared to human error incidents (Knapton,
Hunter & Rundblad; submitted 2010).
The first water notice issued was ‘Do Not Drink’. To
date there is only one previous study of this advice, a
human-error incident in Israel in 2001. Non-compliance
was estimated to 18% [33]. We found that non-compliance
for drinking was significantly higher for the ‘Do Not Drink’
notice (47.2%) compared to the ‘Boil Water’ notice
(29.3%). Similarly, overall non-compliance was also signifi-
cantly higher: 62.9% versus 48.3%. By contrasting partici-
pants’ use of unboiled and boiled tap water, we can see for
the first time that the higher use of contaminated water
during the ‘Do Not Drink’ notice stage is due to consu-
mers boiling the water, presumably due to a belief that it
renders it safe to drink and use. These results are in line
with Rundblad’s [34] hypothetical ‘Do Not Drink’ scenario
study which predicted that 39.3% of consumers would boil
and drink contaminated water. In the Mythe incident,
there were attempts to neutralise this common folk belief
by including additional information on notices and in
material supplied to media and the public. It is beyond the
scope of this study to evaluate if this addition did impact
consumer behaviour; however as the high degree of non-
compliance here suggests, this measure alone is far from
sufficient. It is highly likely that this folk belief in boiling is
linked to the aforementioned binary folk classification of
water. The higher degree of non-compliance for ‘Do Not
Drink’ is not because consumers acted differently for the
two notices, but rather that the protective measures they
took were more or less the same, and as such, they were
not sufficient for the more restrictive notice.
It should be noted that many consumers varied in
their behaviour such that they displayed a mixture of
safe and unsafe behaviours. Some also engaged in over-
cautious behaviour such as flushing the toilet with
boiled tap water or avoiding to flush. The mixture of
risky and over-cautious actions can be attributed to con-
sumers not being aware or being unsure of what actions
are unsafe. The title of the notice ‘Do Not Drink’ is
highly misleading as it fails to highlight all ingestion
actions listed on the notice [34]; an alternative title,
such as ‘External Use Only’ could prove more informa-
tive. In addition, the Drinking Water Inspectorate were
strongly critical of the notice issued by the health autho-
rities because it did not follow water industry standards
and the messages were unclear [20]. We also found that
17.6% carried on using temporary water supplies after
the tap water had been declared safe, which is similar to
the 10% of consumers continuing to boil water after the
‘Boil Water’ notice was lifted in Willocks and colleagues’
study of 2000 hospital employees in the North Thames
region, UK, in 1997 [32]. Information and reassurance
that water is safe or that certain water actions are safe
during a particular notice are as important from a
health point of view as informing about unsafe actions.
Worries about potential health hazards can cause severe
anxiety and, like detection of discolouration and odour
in the water, causes increases in reports of symptoms of
waterborne illness [35]. It is vital that the titles of
notices be reviewed and that the public’s classification
of water and beliefs about precautionary actions such as
boiling be addressed through public health education.
It is important to separate the public’s perception of
information sources and their behaviour. While media
has been found to impact general risk perceptions
because these perceptions are impersonal, they do not
necessarily impact the personal risk perceptions that
would initiate behaviour responses [36]. In the present
study, media did not affect consumer behaviour. How-
ever, BBC Radio Gloucestershire came to take up a
rather unique position. Throughout the incident, it
remained the primary information source, both in terms
of usage and preference, and its association with feeling
informed was approaching significance. BBC Radio
Gloucestershire estimates that roughly half the popula-
tion of Gloucestershire kept up-to-date about the crisis
by listening in, and their website saw a 159% increase of
users (personal communication). We believe that its
apparent success rested on more than radio being easily
accessible. Other local mass media was also favoured;
notably, local newspapers were positively associated
with clarity of advice. This could indicate a need for
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geographic-specific information [28]. Severn Trent
Water followed standard water industry practice and
issued frequent and regular bulletins to the local media
in parallel to issuing notices. BBC Radio Gloucestershire
was quick to broadcast not only about the mains water
loss, but also about locations of distribution sites. Users
of local radio therefore knew there was no need to buy
bottled water. Another important step taken was the
broadcasting of the daily press conferences with updates
from Severn Trent Water and Gloucestershire Consta-
bulary. Altogether, BBC Radio Gloucestershire was able
to establish themselves as a timely and trustworthy
information source. Building on the example of BBC
Radio Gloucestershire, it is essential that local media be
pre-prepared and, during an event, be continuously up-
dated to maximise their role in ensuring public safety.
Although a potential key player in public behaviour
response, no information source was associated with
water behaviour. We did, however, find that those in
paid employment were significantly less likely to comply
with drinking water advice. Demographic factors such as
socioeconomic status have previously been found to
influence behaviour during natural disasters [37-39]. In
order to ensure appropriate and safe behaviour during
natural disasters, public health education needs to reach
all income quartiles, at home or at work.
Lack of electricity contributed to non-compliance after
Hurricane Rita [13]. In this incident, approximately 20%
of our participants were without electricity, but loss of
mains electricity occurred at the same time as consu-
mers were without main tap water and only lasted for
24 hours. Consequently, electricity could only have
impacted boiling of bowser water. However, compliance
with bowser water advice was very high: 88.7% (drink-
ing) and 72.7% (including food preparation, etc.) Bowser
advice is more consistent and thus less open to interpre-
tation as it is water industry practice for every bowser to
bear a clear permanent ‘Boil Water’ message at the
point where consumers draw water. Even so, whether
consumers conceptualised the instruction to boil the
water as relating to use of unsterilised collection vessels
rather than unsafe bowser water could not be ascer-
tained in the present study.
Whilst bowser water was used, it was not popular for
drinking. Instead, bottled water was preferred during
both notices. It has been suggested that bowser water
and bottled water serve slightly different purposes, with
the former to be used for personal hygiene and cooking,
and the latter for drinking. However, it was not clear
from the study whether consumers understood such a
distinction, or whether there is a general distrust in the
quality of bowser water. Thus in future incidents, bottled
water should be considered a priority over bowser water,
where supply, distribution and recycling allows. More
than half of consumers bought bottled water even though
the Security and Emergency Measures Direction 1998
requires all water companies to provide a minimum of
10 litres of water per person per day in case of supply
failure [15]. We trace buying of bottled water to the pub-
lic not being aware of this provision duty, especially since
consumers who found out about the water loss before-
hand tended to refrain from buying bottled water. It is
also possible that consumers did not trust the water com-
pany to supply enough water and in time.
Conclusion
A high proportion of consumers, especially elderly,
reported not having used the official leaflets containing
advice on safe and unsafe water behaviour. Instead, local
media and family/friends functioned as main informa-
tion channels. Contacts with local media and commu-
nity/personal networks should be established,
maintained and kept up-to-date with drinking water
standards and emergency protocol, so that when an
incident occurs official advice can reach all consumers
of all demographic backgrounds in a timely fashion.
High degrees of non-compliance, especially for the ‘Do
Not Drink’ notice, are the result of consumers employ-
ing insufficient protective measures, presumably due to
incorrect folk beliefs regarding water contaminants and
boiling. Unsafe behaviour was commonly coupled with
over-cautious behaviour illustrating that consumers are
equally unaware of what actions are safe. Current public
health education provision should be evaluated and
drinking water knowledge be included, in order to mini-
mise risky behaviour and avoid unnecessary stress from
over-caution during incidents.
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